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When the Federal Government has a requirement for a good
or service, it contracts with individuals or industry with the
understanding that these goods or services will be of high
quality and reasonable cost. The manner in which these items
or services are procured within the Executive Branch of the
Federal Government is stipulated in the Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR)
.
The Federal Acquisition Regulation System is established for
the codification and publication of uniform policies and
procedures for acquisition by all executive agencies. [Ref
.
1]
The FAR also defines the types of contracts authorized for use
by the Federal Government, and classifies them into two basic
types: Fixed-Price and Cost-Reimbursement. Within these two
classifications there are various sub-categories.
Fixed-Price contracts, "provide for a firm price or, in
appropriate cases, an adjustable price." [Ref. l:sec. 16.201]
Under Fixed-Price contract types, the contractor assumes
primary responsibility for financial risk. The types of
Fixed-Price contracts referenced in the FAR are:
(1) Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP)
.




(4) Fixed-Price with Economic Price Adjustment (FPE)
.
All fixed price contracts, except the FFP, include incentives
or adjustments to accommodate various types and levels of
uncertainty or risk involved, most commonly regarding time and
the economy.
Cost-Reimbursement contracts "provide for payment of
allowable incurred cost, to the extent prescribed in the
contract." [Ref. l:sec. 16.301] In contrast to the Fixed-
Price contracts, Cost-type contracts pass the bulk of
financial risk to the Government. The Government reimburses
the contractor for allowable costs up to the cost ceiling of






Selection of the appropriate contract type is one of the
most important decisions a contracting officer must make to
ensure that the Government obtains the desired end item at a
reasonable cost. If chosen correctly, the contract type can
also motivate the contractor to perform as desired,
specifically influencing cost control, delivery, and quality
of the end item. The contracting officer must determine which
contract type will best serve the Government's interest and at
the same time incentivize the contractor to perform in an
acceptable manner. The FAR provides the contracting officer
with the following points to consider when making this choice.
1. Price Competition
Whenever possible, procurement actions should be com-
peted. Competition normally facilitates achievement of





Price analysis is the process by which the contracting
officer analyzes proposed prices to determine whether the
price offered is reasonable. It includes comparing proposed
prices with such things as historical prices, market prices,
and other competitive quotes.
3 Cost Analysis
Cost analysis involves the evaluation of an offeror's
cost or pricing data. These data are analyzed to determine




4 Type and Complexity of the Requirement
Here the contracting officer assesses the degree of
risk assumed by both parties. The more complex and uncertain
the requirement, the greater the risk that will probably be
accepted by the Government.
5. Urgency of the Requirement
If the item or service is required on an accelerated
basis the Government may need to give the contractor
incentives to meet the desired delivery schedule or assume a
greater portion of the cost risk of the contract.
6
.
Period of Performance or Length of Production Run
The contracting officer should consider economic
conditions, possibly allowing for periodic reviews to assess
possible economic fluctuations during contract performance.
7 Contractor's Technical Capability and Financial
Responsibility
An offeror's technical performance capability and
financial health must be established by the contracting
officer prior to contract award.
8 Adequacy of the Contractor's Accounting System
The contractor's accounting system must be capable of




If the offeror holds other Government contracts, the
contracting officer must determine what impact these contracts
will have on the proposed contract.
10 . Extent and Nature of Proposed Subcontracting
If an offeror proposes subcontracting much of the
work, the contracting officer should assess and consider the
degree of risk being assumed by the prime contractor when
selecting the appropriate contract type.
Recognizing that the contract types listed do not
cover every situation, the FAR also permits the use of hybrid
contracts in which characteristics of more than one contract
type are combined. However, the FAR states that the use of
hybrid contracts applies only to negotiated contracts and that
the use of sealed bidding must result in either a FFP or FPE
contract.
^ A major concern of the Federal Acquisition Policy is
obtaining a quality product at a "fair and reasonable price,"
while still motivating the contractor to perform. Yet in the
majority of Government contracts, the costs and profit/ fee to
be paid to the contractor are determined i- at contract award,
essentially leaving the Government few or no options with
which to motivate the contractor during performance.
Of all the identified types of contracts in the FAR,
qrxly one uses "after-the-fact" fee determination in appraising
a contractor's performance: the award fee contract. However,
the FAR only discusses the award fee in the context of cost-
reimbursement contracts. Because the FAR limits its
discussion to this area, the question arises—Should the award
fee be limited to cost type contracts or can this approach be
used in Fixed-Price contracts as well? This thesis will
explore the possibility of this expanded use of the award fee.
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The objectives of the research are:
(1) to determine if a new contract type should be
recognized by the FAR, one that combines the
characteristics of a fixed-price contract with an
award-fee, called a Fixed-Price-Award-Fee contract.
(2) to determine the uses and limitations of this hybrid
contract type.
(3) to explain why it should be recognized as a separate
contract type rather than merely a hybrid.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Given the ^receding general and specific objectives, the
following primary research question was posed: Is the award
fee concept applicable to a Fixed-Price type contract?
Secondary research questions were deemed pertinent in
addressing the basic question. They are:
(1) What is an award fee incentive?
(2) When would a Fixed-Price-Award-Fee contract be used in
Federal procurement?
(3) What are the advantages and disadvantages of a Fixed-
price-award-fee contract?
(4) What changes would be necessary in the FAR in order to
recognize a Fixed-price-award-fee contract type?
D. SCOPE
The main thrust of this thesis focuses on determining the
circumstances under which a FPAF contract could be recognized
in the FAR. The analysis will also explain when it should be
used, including a discussion of its advantages and
limitations. The thrust of this research is to determine the
usefulness of this contract type in the Federal Government.
One of the secondary goals of this research is to describe the
uniqueness of the award fee contract in its "after-the-fact,"
subjective determination of the fee payable to a contractor.
E . METHODOLOGY
To answer the primary and secondary research questions,
two research techniques were employed. First, a comprehensive
search of available literature dealinq with incentive and
award fee contracting, contractor motivation, and motivation
theory was conducted. Second, interviews with various person-
nel in the policy sections of several Executive Federal
Agencies were conducted. These included interviews with
individuals in contracting, program offices, and other
acquisition personnel that it was believed would contribute to
this study. A list of the people interviewed appears in
Appendix A of this thesis, and a list of the general interview
questions appears in Appendix B.
E. LIMITATIONS
The major limitation to this study was the lack of
specific data on the topic. The FPAF contract type has been
used on only a limited basis. However, the researcher
believes that the data are sufficient to support the study's
conclusions and recommendations and the answers to the
research questions.
G. ASSUMPTIONS
This study assumes that the reader commands a general
knowledge or basic familiarity with Federal contracting
language and the Federal acquisition process. It is further
assumed that the reader is aware of the relationship that
exists between industry and the Federal Government in
contracting methodology.
H. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT
The research is organized in the following manner:
Chapter I contains the introduction and research questions to
be analyzed. Chapter II contains some basic background
information on and definition of contract types recognized in
the FAR and a brief discussion on incentive contracting in
general. Chapter III discusses the Award Fee Concept,
history, theory, structure and general characteristics.
Chapter IV outlines the Fixed-Price-Award-Fee Contract along
with the uses of this type of contract, and how it could be
incorporated into the FAR. Chapter V provides conclusions
derived from the research, and recommendations on the use of
the Fixed-Price-Award-Fee contract by Federal Agencies.
II. BACKGROUND
A. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) outlines various
contract types and their general applicability based on the
procurement situation and/or complexity of the supplies or
services being procured. These contract types are categorized
based on the degree of cost risk assumed by the Government and
the contractor. They range from Firm-Fixed-Price, which
places the greatest cost risk on the contractor, to Cost-Plus-
Fixed-Fee, which places the greatest risk on the Government.
All other contract types fall between these two extremes and
can be described as incentive or adjustable contracts. This
chapter will first briefly describe each contract type
delineated in the FAR, and second define incentive contracts,
including the award fee incentive.
B. FIRM-FIXED-PRICE
This type of contract "locks-in" the price of the product
or service at time of contract award and does not allow any
adjustment in contract price, except as may be allowed by
specific contract clauses incorporated into the contract. As
discussed earlier, this type of contract places the burden of
cost risk on the contractor and "providesmaximum incentive
for the contractor to control costs and perform effective ly
and impose a minimum administrative burden upon the
contracting parties." [Ref. l:sec. 16.202-1]
Use of the Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) contract is appropriate
when "off-the-shelf" commercial items or supplies or services
with clear and definitive specifications are procured, and
when "fair and reasonable" prices can be easily determined.
C. FIXED-PRICE WITH REDETERMINATION
When a firm price can be determined for only the initial
period of time, "but not for subsequent periods of contract
performance," [Ref. l:sec. 16.205-2] use of this contract type
is appropriate. There are two types of FPR contracts, one
provides for a firm fixed price for a specified period in the
contract, the other provides for "prospective redetermination
at a stated time or times during performance" [Ref. l:sec
16.205-1] of the contract.
At a specified point in time, negotiated in the original
contract (number of deliverables, calendar days, etc.),
discussions will be opened to determine if price
redetermination, either upward or downward, is necessary. The
contract may also include a ceiling price where suitable and
"once established may be adjusted only by operation of
contract clauses providing for equitable adjustment or other
revision of the contract price under stated circumstances."
[Ref. l:sec. 16.205-2]
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The Fixed-Price with Redetermination (FPR) contract cannot
be used when use of a FFP or FPI contract would be
appropriate, or when the contractor does not have an
accounting system adequate for price redetermination.
D. FIXEC-PRICE WITH ECONOMIC PRICE ADJUSTMENT
If instability exists in the market place, such as in
periods of high inflation, this type of contract may be
appropriate. There are three types of price adjustments
defined in the FAR under this contract type. They are:
(1) Adjustments based on established prices.
(2) Adjustments based on actual costs of labor or material.
(3) Adjustments based on cost indexes of labor or
material. [Ref. l:sec. 16.203-1]
These adjustments can be up to ten percent of the base price
of the contract, both upward and downward. The contracting
officer determines the base level from which the adjustments
will be made.
The negotiated adjustments included in the FPE contract
take some of the cost risk away from the contractor. The FPE
still holds an advantage for the Government because
uncertainties which would otherwise be reflected in a higher
contract price can be identified and covered separately by a
price adjustment clause. This type of contract is used when
the contracting officer determines that it is necessary to
protect either the Government or the contractor against
significant economic fluctuations.
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E. FIXED-PRICE INCENTIVE CONTRACTS
There are two types of Fixed-Price Incentive (FPI)
contracts—Firm Target and Successive Targets. Both provide
for adjustments in profit and establishment of final contract
price based upon a predetermined formula that relates final
contract cost to initial target costs. The basic elements of




(4) Share formula (s) for establishing the final profit and
price.
Application of this type of contract is appropriate when
a FFP contract would not be suitable, such as in operational
system development or initial production where some
uncertainty exists, making a FFP contract impractical. The
profit incentive (positive or negative) is structured to
influence the contractor to employ effective cost control and
to perform satisfactorily. However, the share formula
negotiated in advance allows some of the profit loss or gain
to be shared between the Government and contractor, based on
the contractor's ability to reach target cost. The price
ceiling ensures that if the contractor performs very




This contract type is a cost-reimbursement contract,
incorporating a fee adjusted through a formula based on the
relationship that total allowable cost bears to target cost.
It is similar to the FPI contract, but since it is cost-
reimbursable, there is no price ceiling. The target cost,
target fee, minimum and maximum fee, and the fee adjustment
formula are established at contract award. After performance
of the contract, the fee payable to the contractor is
determined in accordance with the negotiated formula. The
purpose of the CPIF contract is to provide an incentive for
the contractor to manage contract costs effectively and
thereby achieve the maximum allowable fee.
» The CPIF contract is normally used for research and
development contracts where cost unknowns are common.
G. COST-PLUS -AWARD- FEE
This type of cost-reimbursement contract provides the Gov-
ernment with a method of incorporating incentives into
contracts for goods or services that are characterized by
subjective performance criteria. These reguirements do not
lend themselves to the objective measurements that are
necessary for structuring incentive contracts. A more
detailed explanation of this contract type is provided later
in the thesis since it is the award fee that is being applied
to fixed price contracts.
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H. COST-PLUS-FIXED-FEE
The Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) contract falls at the
opposite end of the risk allocation spectrum from the FFP
contract. In the CPFF contract, the Government assumes all
the cost risk and thus gives the contractor little or no
incentive for effective management of costs. This type of
contract provides for the payment of a fixed fee to the
contractor which, once negotiated, does not vary with the
actual cost of the contract. It can only be adjusted as a
result of requirements changes to the original terms of the
contract. Use of the CPFF contract is normally limited to
efforts that may present too great a risk to the contractor to
allow use of another cost-reimbursement contract type.
Examples of appropriate application of CPFF contracts are:
performance of research or preliminary exploration or study in
which the level of effort is unknown, and use of a CPIF
contract is not sensible.
I. INCENTIVE CONTRACTS
The purpose of these types of contracts is to provide an
incentive arrangement that motivates a contractor to more
efficiently manage contract performance and product quality,
thus achieving better cost control. Use of incentive type
contracts are by no means a modern innovation in Federal
procurement policy. They have been used in one form or
14
another and in various applications throughout the history of
the United States.
Both the Monitor of the Civil War and the Wright brothers'
"heavier-than-air machine" were purchased under an incentive
contract. The monitor had to float, attain a specified
minimum speed, and win its first battle before the
contractor was paid. The Wright brothers received a $5,000
bonus in addition to their $2 5,000 contract when their
flying machine exceeded the target speed by more than two
miles per hour. [Ref. 2]
Use of incentive contracts in Defense contracting became
more prevalent in the 1960s. Robert McNamara, then Secretary
of Defense, was faced with increasing Congressional interest
in Department of Defense procurement policies. Specifically,
the lawmakers were concerned with widespread cost growth that
characterized DoD contracting at that time. These overruns
were attributed to two reasons. First, Congress perceived
apparent "gold-plating" by defense contractors. Second, they
believed that the CPFF contract, which was predominantly used
for procurement of newly developed systems in the Defense
Department, provided little, if any, incentive for the
contractor to control costs. Secretary McNamara directed the
use of incentive contracts as a means of inducing greater
contractor effectiveness in controlling and reducing costs.





. .An incentive is defined in the dictionary as: "something
inciting to action or effort as the fear of punishment or the
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expectation of reward." [Ref. 3] In Federal procurement the
term incentives are best defined as:
Contractual incentives which establish automatic procedures
for measuring specific results of contractor efforts and
financially rewarding or penalizing contractors according to
pre-determined formulae. [Ref. 4]
y' All Government contract types provide some incentives, but the
degree of the incentive depends upon the specific contract
type. Incentives are most commonly associated with FPI , CPIF,
and CPAF contracts. According to the FAR, the specific
purposes of incentive contracts are:
(1) Establishing reasonable and attainable targets that are
clearly communicated to the contractor; and
(2) Including appropriate incentive arrangements designed
to (i) motivate contractor efforts that might not otherwise
be emphasized and (ii) discourage contractor inefficiency
and waste. [Ref. l:sec. 16.401]
Although current acquisition policy would not allow the
use of an incentive structure such as the one applied in the
Monitor contract, the reason for employing incentives has
remained the same
—
providing the Government with a means to
motivate the contractor to achieve a desired outcome, while
v maintaining a way to protect the Government if performance is
not accomplished. Incentives also provide flexibility when
the Government cannot quantify or adequately describe the
exact supplies or services for which it is contracting.
The primary motivator used in incentive contracting is
profit or fee. It may be more appropriately defined as a
means by which a contractor can obtain or lose funds depending
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upon the company's performance. Although profit is not the
only factor that motivates a contractor:
The profit motive is the essence of incentive contracting.
Incentive contracts utilize the drive for financial gain
under risk conditions by rewarding the contractor through
increased profit for attaining cost (and sometimes
performance and schedule) levels more beneficial for the
Government than expected (target) and by penalizing him
through reduced profit for less than (target) expected
levels. [Ref. 5]
In applying predetermined, formula driven incentives, the FAR
addresses four types of incentives:
(1) ...cost incentives which take the form of a profit or
fee adjustment formula and are intended to motivate the
contractor to effectively manage costs. [Ref. l:sec.
16.402-l(a)
]
(2) Technical performance incentives [which] may involve a
variety of specific characteristics that contribute to the
overall performance of the end item. [Ref. l:sec. 16.402-
2 (c) ] These incentives should be designed to tailor profit
or fee to results achieved by the contractor, compared with
specific target goals. [Ref. l:sec: 16. 402-2 (a)]
(3) Delivery incentives should be considered when
improvements from a required delivery schedule is a
significant Government objective. [Ref. l:sec. 16.402-3(a)]
(4) [Multiple incentives which] motivate the contractor to
strive for outstanding results in all incentive areas [and]
compel trade-off decisions among the incentive areas. [Ref.
l:sec. 16.402-4 (a)
]
Regardless of the type of incentive used, the FAR requires
that "No incentive contract may provide for other incentives
without also providing a cost incentive (or constraint)."
[Ref. l:sec. 16.402-l(a)]
The reasons for using incentives in contracting were docu-
mented as follows:
(1) Incentives motivate efficient contract management and
achievement of a high performance product.
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(2) Incentives enable the Government to reward contractors
on the basis of demonstrated management ability and product
performance.
(3) Incentives assign to the contractor a larger portion of
contract risk than he would bear with a CPFF contract.
(4) Incentives provide explicit communication of the
Government's contracting objectives. [Ref. 6]
Basically, incentive contracts fall into two categories
—
incentive fee and award fee. The use of the incentive
contract types, Fixed-Price-Incentive and Cost-Pius-Incentive
are limited to objectively measurable performance areas that;
"allocate 'bonus' fees or penalties automatically on the basis
of a contractor's measured achievement of predetermined
quantitative cost, performance, or schedule criteria." [Ref.
7]. Thus the basic incentive contract is objective in the
manner in which it influences contractor performance. The
basis of determining final profit is established at the time
of contract award, in advance of performance. In an award fee
incentive structure, the total additional profit or fee
available is also established at the time of contract award.
However, the award fee incentive allows for subjective, after-
the-fact evaluations to determine the amount of fee or profit
earned. Therefore, it has the potential to have more of an
influence on contractor performance.
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III. THE AWARD FEE CONCEPT
A. HISTORY
Even though the objective nature of incentive contracting
is designed to motivate a contractor, once the contract is
awarded, the Government has no means of redirecting the
contractor's efforts if the original incentives were not
really a motivation. Therefore, before the introduction of
award fee contracting, the Government was still searching for
a method that would influence the contractor after award of
the contract and that was flexible enough to change as the
areas needing attention became important. The solution was a
system that would provide a contractor with additional profit
or fee during and at the conclusion of the contract
performance. This concept was first explored by the Navy and
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in
1962.
The after-the-fact award fee contracting alternative
resulted from painful recognition of problems of uncertainty
associated with setting contract performance targets very
far in advance of actual performance, from a need for
programmatic flexibility in the face of changing situations,
and from acknowledgement of the inescapable fact that many
aspects of contractor performance important to program
outcomes stubbornly resisted quantification and objective
assessment. [Ref. 8]
The purpose behind the award fee incentive method is to allow
the Government to reward a contractor based on actual contract
performance. It is designed to be a flexible management tool
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through which the Government can communicate its approval or
disapproval of contractor progress, management, and cost
control. The importance the Government places on each
evaluation criterion is allowed to change during contract
performance as the Government sees a need for increased atten-
tion in a specific area.
The first award fee contracts were issued in the early
1960s, and were granted conditional approval for use in 1963.
The concept finally gained formal approval and was recognized
in the Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR) in 1968 as
a sub-category of cost-reimbursement type contracts. The FAR
currently describes the award fee concept as:
...an award amount that the contractor may earn in whole or
in part during [contract] performance and that is sufficient
to provide motivation for excellence in such areas as
quality, timeliness, technical ingenuity, and cost-effective
management. [Ref. l:sec. 16.404-2]
B. THE AWARD FEE THEORY
The concern in developing the award fee was how best to
ensure that the contractor continued to perform in a manner
beneficial to the Government after contract award. At the
time of contract award, the contractual relationship is
established and, hopefully, there will be no difficulty in the
fulfillment of the contractual obligation. However, once a
contract is awarded, the contractor is free to proceed as
necessary as long as the measurable requirements of the
20
contract are met and all costs incurred are reasonable,
allowable, and allocable under a cost-reimbursable contract.
Yet, there are some goods and services procured by the
Government that are not easily evaluated using only objective,
measurable performance standards. The Government was still
concerned that traditional contract incentives did not extend
to non-measurable aspects of contract performance and could
not be adjusted after contract award. In establishing the
award fee incentive, the Government's intent was to introduce
a set of subjective evaluation criteria tied to a pool of
funds, in addition to base fee or profit, that could be
allotted to a contractor for performance that exceeded
guantifiable contract reguirements in the areas identified by
the criteria. It was designed to ensure that periodic perfor-
mance evaluations were conducted by both buyer and supplier,
satisfying the Government's desire to focus increased and con-
tinued management attention after contract award, and encour-
aging more direct and freguent communication between the two
parties.
Currently, use of an award fee is recognized in the FAR
only as part of a cost-reimbursement contract called Cost-
Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF) . Should the application of this
incentive structure be limited to cost-reimbursement contracts
or can its application be appropriately extended to fixed-
price contracts?
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Fixed-price contracts are used when any uncertainties
associated with contract performance are few or small enough
not to impact upon the contractor's ability to deliver the
required product or perform the required service. [Ref. 9]
This application includes contracts in which the Government's
emphasis is on such things as quality, meeting supportability
goals, and other special requirements like leader-follower.
This means that the appropriate application of fixed-price
contracts covers situations involving both objective and
subjective performance evaluation. Since the award fee allows
the Government to better motivate contractors in their
performance of subjective criteria, it follows that the use
of an award fee could enhance contractor performance under
some fixed price contracts.
f/ The Award Fee is best applied when the Government's
requirements cannot be objectively detailed in the contract
specifications. In the opinion of Raymond Hunt of State
University of New York, Buffalo, this incentive tool, "comes
closer to fulfilling the principle that profits should be
earned, not awarded in advance" [Ref. 10] than any other
Government contract incentive.
C. THE AWARD FEE STRUCTURE
The FAR prescribes three basic elements that must be in-
cluded in any contract using an award fee incentive. These
elements are (1) a base fee, (2) an award fee, and (3) the
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evaluation criteria used to determine contractor performance
and relate that performance to an amount of award fee earned
during established evaluation periods. The evaluation
criteria and periods are stated in the Request for Proposal
(RFP) , in the actual contract, and, if used, in the Award Fee
Evaluation Plan.
1. Base or Fixed Fee
A base or fixed fee is established at the time of con-
tract award. There is no established limit on the range of
the base fee in the FAR, but, the Department of Defense
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) limits the
base fee to a range between zero and three percent of the
estimated costs of the contract [Ref. 11], while the
Department of Energy (DoE) limits the base fee to "50 percent
of the maximum allowable CPFF fee or the fee developed using
the weighted guidelines method, whichever is applicable."
[Ref. 12] Whichever agency directive is use, however, the
combination of award fee and base fee cannot exceed the
"maximum limits" of fee payable as stated in the FAR. When
used, the base fee rate should not be so high that the portion
remaining for the award fee pool is too small to influence
contractor performance. This base fee is calculated as a per-
centage of the target contract cost at the time of award. The
base fee;
...is designed to compensate the contractor for profit
evaluation factors such as risk, investment, and the nature
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of the work to be performed, but in an amount commensurate
with the minimum acceptable performance. [Ref. 9:p. 1-25]
As the base fee is reduced, the award fee can be increased,
and so have a greater impact on the contractor's performance.
2
.
Award or Variable Fee
An award or variable fee is also established at
contract award in the form of a pool that can be used by the
Government to pay profit or fee to the contractor above that
established in the base fee. The difference between the base
fee and maximum fee is the award fee pool. The amount of
funds available in the "pool" should be high enough to
maintain the contractor's management attention throughout the
period of contract performance. The amount of the award fee
payment, which may be earned in whole, part, or not at all,
will be determined by the criteria established by the evalu-
ation standards in the contract. Limitation on use of the
award fee pool is determined by agency regulation or
directive.
3 Evaluation Periods and Criteria
Evaluation periods and criteria that are used to ap-
praise the contractor must be delineated in the contract [Ref.
l:sec. 16.404(b)(2)]. Determining the criteria by which to
measure a contractor's performance is a function of the
contracting agency and will vary among contracts, but should
not be a negotiable item in the procurement process. Although
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the FAR provides no strict guidance on what these criteria
should be, they generally consist of;
(1) quality of contractor's output.
(2) management of the contract requirements.
(3) cost control (in cost-reimbursement contracts).
(4) quality of contractor's performance.
Whatever criteria are used, they should always be a fair and
reasonable measure of satisfactory contract performance. The
contractor must understand the evaluation criteria and that
the weights assigned to these criteria may change during the
course of contract performance. The contract must also state
the number of evaluation periods that will occur and the
intervals between these periods.
The above elements are required to be stated in the
contract but the organization, methodology, and authority of
the individuals used to determine the award fee are not. To
enhance the award fee process, an Award Fee Evaluation Plan
(AFP) , although not specifically required by the FAR, may be
used to delineate the evaluation criteria, award fee payment
plan, and the organization and procedures of the award fee
determination officials. The purpose of this plan is to
establish the organization and responsibility of those
individuals assigned to determine the award fee. Although it
is not required, including the evaluation plan not only allows
a prospective contractor to review and compare his control
systems against the evaluation criteria, it also ensures that
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the contractor understands the award fee determination
criteria. The AFP also identifies the Award Fee Determination
Official (ADO) (sometimes referred to as the Fee Determination
Official (FDO) ) , the organization of the Performance
Evaluation Board (PEB) if used, the Performance Monitors (PM)
,
and the Award Fee Payment Plan. [Refs. 10; 13]
The FDO is the member responsible for approving and
authorizing payment of any award fee earned during an
evaluation period. He is also responsible for approving any
changes to the evaluation plan during contract performance.
[Ref. 14]
A PEB may or may not be formed depending on the
determination of the contracting agency and the complexity and
dollar value of the contract. Membership and organization of
the PEB is also determined by the contracting activity, but at
a minimum should include the Program Manager, Contracting
Officer, and legal counsel. Members should be appointed in
writing and trained on the responsibilities of the PEB. The
purpose of the PEB is to evaluate a contractor's performance
based on reports received from the PM's. The PEB will
determine the performance grade and recommend the award fee
amount to the FDO. [Ref. 14: p. 34]
Individuals assigned as PM's should be familiar with
the contractor and work in close proximity to the place of
contract performance. A PM must also be trained on the
purpose and use of both the award fee and evaluation criteria
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used to judge a contractor's performance. This training is
crucial to ensure that the PM's understand their role in
holding the contractor to the contract requirements without
expecting unreasonable performance standards. There should be
enough PM's assigned to ensure that the contractor receives a
comprehensive evaluation. [Ref. 14 :p. 34]
An award fee payment plan which is based on the
evaluation criteria established in the contract may also be
included. One of the elements of this plan will be to state
whether any portion of the award fee unearned during one
evaluation period will be carried forward to the next period.
The amount of the award fee to be paid is determined by the
Government's judgmental evaluation of the contractor's
performance in terms of the criteria stated in the contract.
This determination is made unilaterally by the Government
and is not subject to the Disputes Clause. [Ref. l:sec.
16.404-2(a)
]
Whether the contract is competitively awarded or sole-
source negotiated, the structure of the award fee provides
feedback to the contractor concerning how well the Government
thinks he is performing.
v/D. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AWARD FEE CONTRACT
One of the main drawbacks of a CPIF or FPI contract is
that they are based on the assumption that profit is a con-
tractor's primary concern and, therefore, the Government's
most powerful motivational tool. This assumption ignores the
fact that profit is only one of many objectives pursued by
Government contractors.
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Studies conducted by various organizations have indicated
that a contractor's management may be willing to sacrifice
profits in the short run in order to:
(1) gain competitive advantage by engaging in developmental
efforts in areas of potential future business,
^ (2) acquire or retain competent personnel in scarce
disciplines,
(3) spread fixed costs over a substantially broader base,
(4) prevent a potential competitor from gaining entry to
the market,
(5) gain carry-over benefits to their commercial business
(commercial spinoffs)
,
(6) improve their opportunity for follow-on Defense
contracts, or
(7) satisfy shareholders by demonstrating the firm's
potential for future growth. [Ref. 6: pp. 8-9]
^ Another problem with the CPIF and FPI contracts is they
assume that once the contract has been awarded, the contractor
will strive to reduce costs in order to maximize his share of
any cost savings based upon the predetermined share formula.
However, contractor's do not always respond to these cost
reduction incentives as the Government expects. One of the
reasons for this apparently poor business judgment is that the
initial profit or fee is calculated as a percentage of
estimated costs. Therefore, the higher the contractor can
raise his estimated costs, the higher will be his profit or
fee. If a contractor bases cost estimates on actual cost
history, the Government's profit calculation method may
encourage inefficient, high-cost practices. This disincentive
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for efficiency will be especially pronounced if the contractor
anticipates follow-on contracts for the same item. The costs
and profit or fee negotiated on these future contracts will
more than likely have some basis in actual cost history.
A second reason for cost over-runs in spite of incentive
arrangements is that: Government contracts are often plagued
with numerous changes. Each change carries with it a new set
of negotiated costs and profit. If the changes are large and
frequent enough, they will eventually frustrate the original
objectives of the incentive.
Yet another problem with these incentives is that the
informal incentive implies that, if actual costs are
substantially different than estimates, it is better to have
a cost overrun than a cost underrun. Large cost underruns
suggest that Government contracting officials did not
negotiate a reasonable price and may cause Congress to reduce
funding for the same or a similar requirement in the future.
[Ref. 15]
The award fee structure attempts to overcome the
weaknesses of the other types of incentive contracts. In
contrast to the FPI and CPIF contract types, the amount of fee
awarded is dependent upon the quality of a contractor's
performance during the period between contract award and
contract completion. Perhaps the greatest benefit of the
award fee is that it requires continual attention to contract
management by both the Government and the contractor. For the
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Government this means the Program Manager and Contracting
Officer must be actively involved in evaluating a contractor's
performance and cannot "pass the buck" to an Administrative
Contracting Officer. If the contractor desires to earn the
award fee, he must maintain active management involvement in
the program.
Certainly the characteristic that most sets award fee con-
tracting apart from other types of contracts is that the award
fee is not subject to the Disputes Clause required in all
Government contracts. That is, once the FDO determines the
award fee amount, the contractor cannot dispute either the
FDO ' s decision or the amount of fee paid. In particular, the
FAR requires that a clause be placed in an award fee contract
that "Expressly excludes from the operation of the Disputes
clause any disagreement by the contractor concerning the
amount of the award fee." [Ref. l:sec. 16.405(e)(3)]
Although no reason for this exclusion is detailed in any
Government regulation, the researcher believes that the award
fee is not subject to Dispute because it is awarded based on
a subjective, after-the-fact evaluation of the contractor's
performance. This evaluation is based strictly on judgment,
and it would be difficult to prove the validity of the award
using normal rules of evidence.
The second most distinguishing characteristic of an award
fee is that it is based upon the Government's judgment of a
contractor's actual performance rather than the anticipation
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of future performance that characterizes the other types of
incentive contracts.
Another characteristic that sets the award fee apart is
that the performance and evaluation criteria can be modified
during contract performance. This gives the Government the
ability to respond quickly to unanticipated problems arising
during performance.
There are also disadvantages associated with award fee
contracting that must be considered when contemplating the use
of this contract type. Perhaps the biggest disadvantage is
the administration expense. In addressing the limitations of
a CPAF contract the FAR stipulates that, "The contract amount,
performance period and expected benefits are sufficient to
warrant the additional administration effort and cost
involved." [Ref. l:sec. 16. 404-2 (c) (3)
]
The administrative undertaking involves the time and
effort necessary to effectively monitor the contractor. This
includes the proper training of all Government evaluators and
officials involved in the award fee process as well as the
actual devotion of these resources during performance.
Evaluations must be timely and detailed enough to allow the
Government to provide effective feedback to the contractor.
Since the award fee amount is determined based on
anticipated contract cost, the pool of funds available must be
fully funded at the time of contract award. If it is not, it
may send a signal to the contractor and the Government
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evaluators that the reduced amount is the maximum amount the
contractor will be awarded. This will act as a disincentive
to the contractor.
Finally, collusion and biased evaluation of the contractor
by Government personnel involved in this process is a possi-
bility when an award fee is used. This problem can be
corrected by documenting all the steps in the evaluation
process and stipulating in writing the reasons for these
decisions. All these factors must be weighed when considering
use of an award fee.
In summary, use of an award fee in contracting
accomplishes the following:
(1) Encourages close cooperation between the Government and
the contractor. This is especially important when the
program under contract is characterized by uncertainty
and is not easily described in detail.
(2) Ensures that the Government will be able to actively
influence contractor performance after award. Because
the amount of fee awarded depends on actual, not an-
ticipated, performance, Government managers are better
able to hold the contractor's attention.
(3) Acknowledges that the contractor's upper level manage-
ment cannot control company operations at the lowest
levels. Their influence is limited to more general
oversight.
(4) Encourages formal and informal communication within the
organizations of the contractor and the Government as
well as between the contractor and the Government.
(5) Acknowledges that, as discussed earlier, the contractor
has many objectives besides increased profits and so
can be motivated by a variety of factors.
(6) Allows the contractor to manage and motivate his em-
ployees as he chooses, avoiding imposition of
unnecessary and extreme Government oversight.
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(7) Recognizes that conditions during contract performance
are constantly changing. The many and varied problems
that arise require continuous management attention if
successful performance is to be achieved.
(8) Gives the Government flexibility in its determination
of the contractor's effectiveness, allowing the
introduction of judgment into the evaluation process
rather than relying strictly on mathematical formulae.
(9) Lends itself to control of contract requirements that
cannot be measured objectively or are not defined in
great detail.
(10) Allows the Government to periodically adjust the
importance it places on each criterion and to evaluate
the contractor's effectiveness in satisfying these
criteria.
(11) Ensures that contract profits are based on actual
performance rather than anticipated performance. [Ref
.
7:pp. 589-590]
Unlike the objective incentives which tend to focus unduly
on measurable, quantitative factors, the award fee incentive
leans toward qualitative, organization, and power-behavioral
factors which so often determine the successful completion of
a contract.
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IV. THE FIXED-PRICE-AWARD-FEE CONTRACT
A. PROBLEMS OF USING FIXED-PRICE-AWARD-FEE AS A
HYBRID CONTRACT
1. Non-Recognition by the Federal Acquisition Regulation
The Fixed-Price-Award-Fee (FPAF) contract is not
recognized as a specific contract type by the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) . Use of the FPAF is currently
limited to hybrid contracts. Hybrid contracts are formed by
combining one or more contract types recognized in the FAR
into a single contract. The researcher discovered that some
Federal Agencies do not believe that hybrid contracts are
authorized, therefore, further supporting the need for
recognizing the FPAF contract as a legitimate contract type.
The researcher interviewed individuals in several
Federal Agencies. Through these interviews it became apparent
that there exist two perspectives on the use of hybrid
contracts in the Government. They are:
(1) Use of any contract type, or variation, is authorized
for use in any Federal procurement action provided it will
benefit the Government's objective. Characteristics
associated with a particular contract can be combined with
other contract types for the procurement of supplies or
services. Approval authority for use of a hybrid contract
rests with the head of the contracting activity.
(2) Use of only those contract types specified in the FAR
are authorized for use in Federal Procurement actions.
Using a combination of contract structures (hybrids) is not
allowed unless approval is granted under a deviation as
stated in the FAR. This deviation must be approved by the
agency head.
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In the researcher's opinion, these two perspectives are a
result of the ambiguous wording in FAR, Subpart 16.102(b).
This paragraph states:
Contracts negotiated under Part 15 may be of any type or
combination of types that will promote the Government's
interest, except as restricted in this part. Contract types
not described in this regulation shall not be used, except
as a deviation under Subpart 1.4. [Ref. l:sec. 16.102(b)]
Those agencies that interpret the FAR to authorize
hybrid contracts focus on the first portion of the paragraph
to "promote the Government's interest." However, most of
these agencies, with the exception of the Department of
Defense (DoD) , limit the use of the award fee to Cost-Plus-
Award-Fee (CPAF) or other combinations of cost-reimbursement
contracts.
Those agencies that do not believe hybrid contracts
are authorized interpret the second sentence in the above FAR
paragraph to mean that only those contract types specifically
described in Part 16 are authorized for use in any Federal
Procurement action unless a deviation is granted by the agency
head or by individuals designated by the agency head. These
agencies and contracting offices were extremely reluctant to
use any hybrid contracts.
Based on the interviews conducted by the researcher,
an agency's willingness to use FPAF contracts, or for that
matter any hybrid contract, depended on the current management
policy of that agency. Their interpretation of the FAR
determined whether or not agencies would use the award fee in
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fixed-price contract actions. Nearly all the individuals
interviewed believed the FAR should specifically recognize the
award fee incentive in fixed-price contracts. Some indicated
that without this recognition, they would not choose a FPAF
contract because their agency did not allow use of hybrids.
2 . Relationship of Fee Limitations to Fixed-Price
Contracts
In cost-reimbursement contracts, the FAR limits the
amount of fee allowed based on the contract's estimated cost.
These are statutory limitations imposed on Cost-Plus-
Incentive-Fee and Cost-Plus-Award-Fee contracts by 10 U.S.C.
2306(d) and 41 U.S.C. 254(b). The maximum fee allowed is:
(1) 15 percent for "experimental, developmental, or research
work," and (2) ten percent for all other work performed under
cost-reimbursement contracts unless a deviation is granted by
the agency head or his designee. [Ref. l:sec. 15.903(d)(1)]
(One additional restriction applies to both cost-reimbursement
and fixed-price contracts which limits fee or profit to six
percent of the estimated cost or price of architect-engi-
neering services for public works or utilities.)
The question then is: Do the fee limitations imposed
by the FAR for cost-reimbursement contracts apply to award fee
incentives when used with fixed-price hybrid contracts?
A review of the available research material revealed
that this question has not been addressed. In fact, the
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researcher was able to find only three references even
remotely related to this question. One recommendation stated:
The maximum fee allowed for a routine project is 10 percent
of the contract's estimated cost excluding the award fee
[FAR 15.903 (d) (1) (iii) ] . Although that limit is listed
under the CPAF section of the FAR, the FPAF incorporates the
award-fee portion of CPAF in order to be a legal combination
of contract types as authorized by FAR 16.102(b). [Ref. 16]
Another stated:
There is no specific policy that covers precisely how to
handle this issue, especially if "sealed bid" procedures are
used; however we can infer from FAR 15. 903 (d) (iii) that the
fee should "not exceed 10% of the contract's estimated
cost ." [Ref. 14:p. 37]
Yet another opinion was:
Since the award fee is defined by the ASPR as a cost-type
contract, it is necessarily subject to the fee limits
imposed on such contracts. The Federal Acquisition
Regulations (FAR) , when issued, are not expected to alter
the substance of the ASPR's provisions on the award fee.
[Ref. 13:p. 52]
Additionally, none of the agency-specific supplements to the
FAR reviewed by the researcher addressed this issue.
Most of the people interviewed agreed that some limit
should be placed on the amount of the award fee that may be
used in a contract. Their recommendations were similar to
those of the above three statements. That is, the award fee
pool should be limited to a maximum of ten percent of the
estimated price of the contract. This recommendation was
based on evidence that the award fee pool does not have to be
large to motivate the contractor. [Ref. 16: p. 39]
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3 . Base Profit/Fee
The base fee represents the minimum dollar amount of
prof it/ fee that a contractor may earn. This profit/ fee is
established to reward a contractor for performing to minimal
standards. The FAR does not define an upper limit to base
prof it/ fee when using an award fee incentive, only stating
that it may be zero.
In fixed-price contracting the risks associated with
the contract shift from the Government to the contractor.
However, the FAR does not state that a contractor is
guaranteed profit/fee for the services performed under a fixed
price contract, but states that a profit/fee incentive,
"represents that element of the potential total remuneration
that contractors may receive for contract performance over and
above allowable costs." [Ref. l:sec. 15.905] This sentence
could be interpreted to indicate that the profit/fee reward
may be set at zero.
The FAR also states that profit/fee objectives shall
not be restricted to a predetermined range.
With the exception of statutory ceilings in 15.903. (d) on
profit and fee, agencies shall not (1) establish
administrative ceilings or (2) create administrative
procedures that could be represented to contractors as de
facto ceilings. [Ref. l:sec. 15.901(c)]
This sentence clearly states that a contractor's proposed
profit/fee goal can not be limited by agency directives and
thus, that an agency cannot restrict the amount of profit/ fee
a contractor may propose for a contract reguirement.
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The question, then, is: Should base profit be
established if an award fee incentive is used with a fixed-
price contract? The researcher proposes two possible methods:
(1) Establish the profit objective as described by the FAR
through negotiations or by means of competitive
solicitation of the contract requirement. The award
fee amount would then be an additional pool separate
from the profit objective avaiLable to the contractor
for above minimal performance.
(2) Establish the base profit objective described by the
FAR through negotiations or by competitive
solicitations. Once the objective is determined,
negotiate a division of this objective into base profit
and award fee.
Whichever method is used, it is clear that an agency cannot
require any offeror to bid zero profit/fee on a proposed
contract.
4 . General Ambiguity of the Award Fee Incentive
The language in the FAR on use of the award fee in
cost-reimbursement contracts is nebulous, leaving much
interpretation on its use to the individual Federal agencies.
In describing the CPAF contract fee application, the FAR
outlines the use of award fee as follows:
(i) The work to be performed is such that it is neither
feasible nor effective to devise predetermined objective
incentive targets applicable to cost, technical performance,
or schedule;
(ii) The likelihood of meeting acquisition objectives will
be enhanced by using a contract that effectively motivates
the contractor toward exceptional performance and provides
the Government with the flexibility to evaluate both actual
performance and the conditions under which it was achieved;
and
(iii) Any additional administrative effort and cost
required to monitor and evaluate performance are justified
by the expected benefits.
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(2) The number of evaluation criteria and the requirements
they represent will differ widely among contracts. The
criteria and rating plan should motivate the contractor to
improve performance in the areas rated, but not at the
expense of at least minimum acceptable performance in all
other areas.
(3) Cost-plus-award-fee contracts shall provide for evalua-
tion at stated intervals during performance, so that the
contractor will periodically be informed of the quality of
its performance and the areas in which improvement is
expected. Partial payment of fee shall generally correspond
to the evaluation periods. This makes effective the
incentive which the award fee can create by inducing the
contractor to improve poor performance or to continue good




The FAR does not stipulate how an award fee incentive should
be structured. The only requirements are that the contract
consist of a base fee, an award fee, evaluation criteria,
stated evaluation periods, and an award fee clause that
excludes the award fee portion of the contract from the
Disputes clause.
The FAR leaves unanswered how to determine the award
fee amount, who shall be responsible for authorizing the award
fee amount, at what level the contractor's performance will be
evaluated, and whether or not the evaluation criteria may be
changed during performance of the contract.
Detailed requirements on use and structure of the
award fee incentive should be the responsibility of individual
agencies. However, in the researcher's view, the FAR should
give more detailed guidance in the areas mentioned above.
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B. DEFINITION OF A FIXED-PRICE-AWARD-FEE CONTRACT
A Fixed-Price-Award-Fee contract is a fixed-price contract
with an award fee (or profit) provision added. The contractor
may earn this fee based on evaluation by the Government of his
performance in stated areas judged during execution of the
contract. The award fee is designed to reward a contractor
for above satisfactory performance. The FPAF contract
combines the reduced cost risk of a firm-fixed-price contract
with the subjective evaluation techniques of the award fee
incentive.
C. STRUCTURE OF A FIXED-PRICE-AWARD-FEE CONTRACT
1. Fixed-Price
This type of contract establishes a firm-fixed-price
at contract award. In this regard, it is similar to a FFP
contract, placing minimal cost risk on the Government and
maximum risk on the contractor. The fixed-price requirement
provides an incentive to the contractor to control contract
costs. It also provides for easy price comparison when the
proposed requirement is competed. The fixed-price provides





This is included in the fixed-price of the contract.
The degree of profit allowed should represent the minimum
amount of profit above costs that the contractor is guaranteed
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for performing at minimal acceptable standards. The range of
the base profit should be determined by each agency's
structured approach as recommended in FAR Subpart 15.9. If
the contractor has a history of performing at minimum
acceptable levels, then a zero base profit may be considered.
The contractor should be allowed consideration for
profit in any performance areas of the contract that will not
be evaluated under the award fee criteria.
3 . Award Fee
The method of choosing the appropriate amount of award
fee is similar to the method addressed in Cost-Plus-Award-Fee
contracts. The award fee amount should be fully funded at the
time of contract award. Evaluation periods and criteria must
also be stipulated in the contract, and, as in the CPAF
contract, the amount of the award fee should be sufficient to
maintain the contractor's management attention throughout the
performance of the contract.
Use of the award fee, when combined with a base fee in
cost-reimbursement contracting, cannot exceed the maximum fee
limitations as stipulated in the FAR. However, no limitation
applies to the award fee incentive when used in fixed-price
contracts. Whichever of the proposed methods is used, the
amount of total award fee should be based on the estimated
cost of the contract. Any base profit objectives should be
excluded in determining the award fee amount.
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4 . The Award Fee Evaluation and Payment Plan
These criteria should be similar to the evaluation
criteria addressed in Chapter III. The only significant
difference is that, unlike a cost-reimbursement contract, when
using a fixed-price contract, cost control is not normally
considered in the evaluation criteria. The level of detailed
procedures needed for use of the Award Fee Plan should be
determined by each agency.
D. CHARACTERISTICS OF A FIXED-PRICE-AWARD-FEE CONTRACT
There are two unique characteristics of an FPAF contract:




The FPAF contract incorporates the features of a firm-
fixed-price contract. The costs to the Government are fixed
and the contract is easier to administer. The contract places
the maximum amount of risk on the contractor and, therefore,
provides maximum incentive to control costs.
2 Award Fee
The award fee amount represents an additional pool of
funds available to the contractor based upon a unilateral non-
disputable evaluation by the Government. The contracting
activity establishes the evaluation criteria on which the
contractor will be judged. The evaluation and subsequent
awards to the contractor, if any, should be based on above
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average performance in the areas of quality control,
timeliness, and responsiveness.
E. USE OF THE TERM "FEE" IN FIXED-PRICE CONTRACTS
No material was found in the research directly concerning
this subject. One reference was made to the use of FFP/AF
when addressing this contract type. [Ref. 13: p. 52] Those
articles reviewed that discussed this subject addressed this
contract type as a Fixed-Price-Award-Fee contract. Indeed,
during the interviews the author conducted on the research
subject, all individuals referred to this contract as FPAF.
In Federal procurement, the term profit is generally as-
sociated with fixed-price contracts and fee with cost-
reimbursement contracts. The term fee is used in Government
procurement to represent an additional monetary reward that a
contractor may earn in addition to the estimated cost of a
contract. Specifically:
In specified cost-reimbursement pricing arrangements, fee
represents an agreed-to amount beyond the initial estimate
of costs. In most instances, fee reflects a variety of
factors, including risk, and is subject to statutory
limitations. Fee may be fixed at the outset of performance,
as in a cost-plus-fixed-fee arrangement, or may vary as in
a cost-plus-incentive-fee arrangement. [Ref. 9:p. B-5]
The term profit, in procurement, also refers to a monetary
amount a contractor may earn that exceeds the contract costs.
Profit is described as:
...the basic motive of business enterprise; on occasion
referred to as "wages of risk." In contract pricing, profit
represents a projected or known monetary excess realized by
a producer or performer after the deduction of cost incurred
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or to be incurred in the performance of a job, task, or
series of the same. [Ref. 9:p. B-8]
The FAR does not clearly distinguish between the use of these
two terms but both are used to describe the same general
objective: the additional monetary benefit that may be earned
by a contractor when supplying the Government with the
required service or product.
Individuals were interviewed concerning changing the term
from "fee" to some form of profit when the award fee incentive
is used in fixed-price contracting. Their responses are
summarized below:
(1) The award fee incentive is understood by both
Government and industry and allows control of
subjective evaluation criteria. Changing the term to
profit would only confuse the rationale for the parties
using this incentive structure.
(2) Even if the term were changed officially, unofficially
this incentive structure would probably still be
referred to as an "award fee" incentive.
(3) If the name is changed, it may require a major change
to the FAR.
Few of the individuals interviewed expressed concern about
use of the term fee in fixed-price contracting. If a new
concept were introduced to the FAR, similar to the award fee,
but with a new undefined title, a minor change to the FAR
would be difficult to justify. In other words, change of the
term "award fee" to some form of profit for use with fixed-
price contracts would require a major revision to the FAR.
Extension of the award fee concept from fixed-price to cost-
reimbursement contracts is far less complicated.
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F. APPLICATION OF THE FIXED-PRICE-AWARD-FEE CONTRACT
The FAR outlines the application of a Cost-plus-award-fee
contract when:
(i) The work to be performed is such that it is neither
feasible nor effective to devise predetermined objective
incentive targets applicable to cost, technical performance,
or schedule;
(ii) The likelihood of meeting acquisition objectives will
be enhanced by using a contract that effectively motivates
the contractor toward exceptional performance and provides
the Government with the flexibility to evaluate both actual
performance and the conditions under which it was achieved;
and
(iii) Any additional administrative effort and cost required
to monitor and evaluate performance are justified by the
expected benefits. [Ref. l:sec. 16. 404-2 (b) (1)
]
These guidelines also apply to the FPAF contract. The only
difference is that there exists sufficient information,
history, and detailed specification that use of a fixed-price
contract would be a better contract vehicle for the proposed
procurement. There is one additional guideline that should be
followed when considering use of a FPAF contract: When the
desired performance for the supplies or products cannot be
objectively measured or defined as contract-specific, but is
still necessary, use of this contract may be used over other
fixed-price contract types. There are certain situations in
which detailed requirements exist that cannot be objectively
specified when defining the contract requirement. Use of an
award fee incentive provides the Government with flexibility
to motivate a contractor in this area.
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Use of FPAF contracts is not new to Federal procurement.
Use of the FPAF contract type is currently being used in
"services" contracts awarded by Department of Defense
component agencies and the Department of the Treasury. This
contract type should not be limited to only services
contracts. Its flexibility allows for a wide range of
applications. FPAF hybrid contracts have been used in con-
struction and hardware contracts, Government-Owned-Contractor-
Operated (GOCO) plants and in conjunction with multiple
incentive fixed-price contracts. [Refs. 13; 16]
This contract type is best utilized in a competitive
environment where the contract price is established by the
service or product market. It also appears to meet the
requirements for sealed bidding procedures provided FAR 14.104
is changed to include this contract type. [Ref. 16 :p. 5-2]
The only limitation imposed by the FAR that would apply to
a FPAF contract is: "The contract amount, performance period,
and expected benefits are sufficient to warrant the additional
administrative effort and cost involved." [Ref. l:sec.
16. 404-2 (c) (3) ] The administration expense is no doubt a
major consideration in the use of any award fee incentive.
However, the major expense associated with a CPAF contract is
the auditing of contract costs. In a FPAF contract, the price
is fixed and evaluation of a contractor's cost control should
not be an evaluation criterion. If the major concerns from
the Government are those previously addressed for use of the
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award fee, the Government must be able and willing to support
the purpose of the award fee concept.
Use of the FPAF contract is not warranted if adequate and
detailed specifications are available and additional emphasis
on factors such as quality, performance, and management is not
appropriate for the required end item or if the requirement is
available in the commercial market.
G. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF A FIXED-PRICE-AWARD-FEE
CONTRACT
1. Advantages
There are several advantages to use of a FPAF
contract. One of these advantages is the firm-fixed-price
aspect of the contract. The contract price for the
requirement is locked in at contract award, placing cost
control responsibility on the contractor. The contractor is
also required to produce an end item or service that is
complete and in conformance with minimum acceptable standards
in the contract.
Another advantage is the use of the award fee
incentive as a motivational tool. It is extremely useful,
when properly applied, as a management tool by the Government
and by the contractor. The fact that this incentive is in the
contract provides the Government with an ability to influence
the contractor in the areas described in the contract's
evaluation criteria. The contractor is awarded an allocation
from the award fee pool based on better-than-average
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performance. The better the contractor performs, the larger
the reward will be. Conversely, if the contractor performs
only to the minimum acceptable levels he should be awarded
none of the award fee pool available for the period evaluated.
The Government has the flexibility to distribute none, some or
all of the award fee to the contractor based upon its
unilateral determination without the decision being subject to
the Disputes clause in FAR 52.233-1.
Thirdly, the evaluation criteria and subsequent
Government evaluations provide direct feedback to the
contractor. In this sense it is a "report-card" [Ref. 13 :p.
7] on how well the Government views the contractor's response
to the evaluated components. If an organization takes pride
in its accomplishments, the award fee incentive can be seen as
a motivational tool beyond the traditional profit incentive.
The contractor may set a goal to achieve as much of the award
fee as possible thus establishing a prestigious objective for
the organization to accomplish.
One response the researcher received indicated that
the contractor's program manager believed he obtained more
responsive action from his company's management on a FPAF
contract than with any other form of Government contract,
including CPAF.
Finally, the flexible nature of the award fee allows
management from both Government and the contractor to respond
quickly to less than favorable evaluations. It also provides
49
the Government the ability to emphasise or re-direct emphasis
during contract performance without major changes to the
contract.
2 . Disadvantages
As with every contract type described in the FAR,
there are advantages and disadvantages associated with each
one. This also applies equally to a FPAF contract.
The administrative expense associated with the use of
the award fee is often its limiting factor. Use of a FPAF
contract requires more active (time) involvement by Government
personnel in the award fee application. The expense of this
contract type is similar to the administrative expense of a
CPAF contract. However, a major portion of the evaluation
process is eliminated in the FPAF contract since there is no
evaluation of a contractor's cost control. Although this does
eliminate one time intensive element of the award fee process
it still requires a performance monitor, a performance
evaluation board and a Fee Determination Official to
contribute the time necessary to properly evaluate the
performance elements of the contract. Exactly where the
trade-off point is must be determined by the contracting
activity, but if the desired outcome warrants the use of the
FPAF contract then the administrative expense should not be a
limiting factor.
All Government personnel involved in the FPAF process
must be thoroughly trained on the intent of the award fee
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provision. This includes eliminating biased attitudes that
may affect the evaluation process and defining what is above
average performance. Care must be exercised to ensure that
the Government representatives do not use this added contract
incentive to "gold-plate" the contract requirement.
The evaluation process must be timely. Informing a
contractor of his performance in an area after the effort has
been accomplished defeats the purpose of the award fee
incentive. Measures must be taken to ensure that the
evaluations are timely, accurate, effectively prepared, fair,
and reasonable so that meaningful feedback can be given to the
contractor.
The amount of the funds for the award fee pool must be
appropriated at the time of contract award. Failure to do so
may give mixed signals to both the Government evaluators and
the contractor concerning the true value the Government places
on this added performance incentive. The award fee amount
should be determined based upon the Government's estimate of
the proposed requirement. The size of the award fee pool does
not have to be large to be effective. [Ref. 17]
H. PROCEDURES TO CHANGE THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION
TO RECOGNIZE THE FIXED-PRICE-AWARD-FEE CONTRACT
1. Changes Required in the FAR
Prior to completion of this thesis, the researcher
obtained information that the Defense Acquisition Regulatory
Council (DAR) had initially approved a change to the FAR
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incorporating the FPAF contract. However, in May 1989 the DAR
council rescinded their approval and incorporated a reference
to the Department of Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement (DFARS) to a FPAF contract.
To incorporate a FPAF contract as a recognized
contract type, certain sections of the FAR must be modified.
Most of the changes will be in FAR Part 16 "Types of
Contract." Recognizing the FPAF in the FAR would require only
moderate changes and, therefore, would not require prior
approval from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) . The
proposed changes are provided in Appendix C to the thesis.
2 . Process to Change the FAR
The process by which changes are submitted, reviewed,
and incorporated into the FAR are delineated in Subpart 1.2,
"Administration" of the FAR, and Subpart 1.5, "Agency and
Public Participation." Maintenance of the FAR is performed
by two councils, the Defense Acquisition Regulatory Council
(DAR) representing the Defense agencies and NASA, and the
Civilian Agency Acquisition Council (CAAC) representing the
Civilian agencies of the Executive Branch of the Government.
Each council is assigned specific areas of responsibility for
maintenance of the FAR. Recommendations to change or amend
any section must be submitted to the appropriate council for
their review and recommendation. The responsible council then
forwards their comments to the other council for their
evaluation.
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Changes to the FAR are classified into two basic
categories: major or minor. A major change to the FAR is
described as a change that would result in a significant
revision to the regulation. In particular the FAR describes
these changes as meaning:
...revisions that alter the substantive meaning of any
coverage in the FAR System having a significant cost or
administrative impact on contractors or offerors, or a
significant effect beyond the internal operating procedures
of the issuing agency. [Ref. l:sec. 1.501-1]
These types of changes to the FAR must be processed within the
guidelines of the Regulatory Flexibility Act and the Paperwork
Reduction Act. Additionally, public comment must be sought
concerning the proposed revision (s) to the regulation.
Minor changes are "editorial, stylistic, or other
revisions that have no impact on the basic meaning of the
coverage being revised." [Ref. l:sec. 1.501-1] Minor changes
are reviewed similarly to the method used for significant
changes except public comment is not normally sought. The
proposed changes to the FAR, suggested by the researcher, are
provided in Appendix C of this thesis. These proposed changes
are considered minor clerical changes with tremendous benefits
to the Federal Government. The fundamental meaning of the
award fee concept remains the same. The intention of these
changes is to clear up the ambiguities concerning use of the




V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The research performed has indicated that a Fixed-price-
award-fee (FPAF) contract should be a contract type recognized
by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) . As discussed in
Chapters II and III, the benefits the Government derives from
using an award fee should not be limited to cost-reimbursement
contracts.
All methods employed by the Government to motivate
contractors, with the exception of the award fee, require that
the Government establish its objective in measurable form at
the time of contract award. The award fee is structured to
allow the Government to evaluate the contractor during
contract performance and to change the emphasis it places on
the evaluation criteria. Because of these unique
characteristics, the award fee holds many advantages over
other methods of contractor motivation. Specifically, the
award fee incentive encourages close cooperation between the
Government and contractor, improves communications both
vertically and horizontally, provides flexibility in
Government oversight of contractor performance, recognizes
that factors other than profit motivate a contractor, and
recognizes that all contract requirements cannot be
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/ specifically detailed and therefore cannot be objectively-
measured.
The advantages listed above suggest that the Government
can derive the greatest benefit from use of the award fee in
situations where it is desirable to encourage a contractor for
performance over and above that which can be objectively
measured and incentivized under other types of contracts. A
specific example of the appropriate applications of the award
fee is when the quality of the contractor's management of the
production process as well as the quality of the end item is
important to the Government. Another example is when the
Government is concerned with the contractor's responsiveness
to changing situations. A third example is when the
Government is interested in motivating the contractor to
perform above the minimum standards identified in the
contract. These examples are certainly not all inclusive.
The award fee can be appropriately used in other situations or
when a combination of areas of motivation are desired.
Fixed-price contracts are appropriately used when the
uncertainty of contract performance is relatively low and,
therefore, the contractor is willing to accept all or most of
the contract cost risk. Unlike cost-reimbursement contracts
which require only the contractor's best efforts for the
period in which funds are available for the contract, fixed-
price contracts require delivery of the end item or
performance of the service. Because fixed-price contracts
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involve the least amount of risk for the Government and
require delivery or performance, their use is preferred over
cot-reimbursement contracts when uncertainties are few and
prices can be fairly easily determined. The Government enters
into fixed-price-award-fee contracts when there are few
performance uncertainties and at the same time the good or
service being procured lends itself to subjective rather than
objective measurements. Some examples of these situations are
support services contracts for such things as janitorial or
mess attendant services. In other cases the Government may
desire to evaluate the contractor throughout his performance
based on the Government's subjective judgment of the quality
of that performance. Another example is contracting for
construction. In this case, the Government may desire to
influence the contractor's compliance with safety requirements
or the quality of his construction practices during contract
performance. A third example is in leader-follower contracts.
In this situation the Government may want to evaluate the
cooperation the leader gives to the follower.
The previous examples show that there are situations in
Government contracting that appropriately fit the use of
fixed-price contracts and, at the same time, lend themselves
to award fee incentives. Limiting the use of the award fee to
cost-reimbursement contracts restricts the Government's
ability to derive the full benefits of the award fee
incentive. Allowing appropriate use of the award fee with
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fixed-price contracting will enable the Government to take
full advantage of this incentive structure. Therefore, in
this researcher's view, the award fee incentive should be
recognized as being appropriate for use with fixed-price
contracts.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are a result of the research
in this study.
1 . Change the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to
Recognize the Fixed-price-award-fee Contract as a
Specific Contract Type
Currently, the use of an award fee in fixed-price
contracting is classified as a hybrid contract. In its
discussion of hybrids, the language of the FAR is subject to
interpretation. Some agencies and procurement offices believe
it is automatically authorized when it serves the Government's
interest. Others believe use of a hybrid requires submittal
of a deviation request to higher authority. This ambiguity
inhibits use of the award fee in fixed-price contracts,
limiting the Government's ability to derive full benefit from
this incentive arrangement. Recognition of the FPAF contract
by the FAR would resolve the ambiguity making use of this
contract type more acceptable. Implementation of this
recommendation requires the approval of both the Defense
Acquisition Regulatory Council and the Civilian Agency
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Acquisition Council. The specific procedures for changing the
FAR were discussed in Chapter IV. H.
2
.
Establish Award Fee Limitations for Fixed-price-award-
Fee Contracts
The FAR provides fee limitations for cost-
reimbursement contracts. However, it places no ceiling on the
profit that may be awarded under fixed-price contracts. The
FAR does not currently provide for the extension of the use of
a fee with a fixed-price contract. Therefore, if the FPAF
contract were recognized within the delineation of award fee
limits, there would be a discontinuity in the FAR. For this
reason, it is recommended that an award fee limitation be
stipulated in the FAR. The appropriate fee limitation should
be established at no greater than ten percent of the estimated
contract cost (contract price excluding profit)
.
3 Base Profit Should Not be a Separate Element of the
Fixed-price-award-fee Contract but Should be
Included in the Contract
In Cost-plus-award-fee contracts, the FAR stipulates
limits for the base fee when an award fee is included in the
contract. In fixed-price contracting, the FAR elucidates that
the Government cannot limit the profit proposed by a
contractor. Rather, the Government must negotiate a
reasonable profit which is to be included in the contract
price. Further, the FAR indicates that although there is no
ceiling on proposed profit, neither must profit always be
paid. In other words, profit must be reasonable but can be as
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low as zero and has no upper limit. Since the contract being
proposed is a fixed-price contract, the profit should be
negotiated as it is in any other fixed-price contract. As
such it should not be a separate element of the FPAF contract,
but should be included in the contract's fixed-price. Of
course, when determining the reasonableness of profit awarded,
the Government contracting officer should consider that an
award fee will also be included in the contract.
4 . Provide Detailed Guidance Covering the Structure of
Award Fee Incentives in the Federal Acquisition
Regulation
Currently, the FAR's discussion of the application of
an award fee is vague. It implies that there should be
evaluation criteria and indirectly addresses the appropriate
limits of base fee, award fee, maximum fee, and evaluation
periods. It does not provide detailed guidance in these
areas. The FAR should at least delineate the key elements of
the award fee structure. At a minimum, this structure should
include:




(5) Fee Determination Official.




C. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1
.
Is the Award Fee Concept Applicable to Fixed-Price
Type Contracts?
The award fee concept is applicable to fixed-price
contracts because these contracts are used to procure goods
and services that entail subjective, after-the-fact Government
evaluation. Use of the award fee is appropriate to these
situations. Additionally, the FAR does not expressly prohibit
use of the award fee with fixed-price contracts.
2 What is an Award Fee Incentive?
An award fee incentive is an evaluation performed by
the Government based upon specified criteria. This evaluation
is unilaterally determined by the Government, subjective in
nature, performed after contract award, and is not subject to
the Disputes clause.
3 . When Would a Fixed-Price-Award-Fee Contract be Used in
Federal Procurement?
Fixed-price-award-fee contracts are appropriately used
when two criteria are met. First, a fixed-price contract must
be suitable, therefore, contract performance uncertainties
must be relatively few and a contract price must be reasonably
determinable. Second, use of the award fee must be
appropriate. This means that the goods or services procured
lend themselves to subjective, after-the-fact evaluation.
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4.
What Would be the Advantages and Disadvantages of a
Fixed-Price-Award-Fee?
The advantages of a FPAF contract are that it promotes
cooperation between the Government and the contractor, it
improves communication within the organization both vertically
and horizontally, it allows flexibility in Government
oversight of contractor performance, it recognizes that
contractor's are motivated by factors other than profit, and
it recognizes that all contract requirements cannot be
objectively measured. Also, because it is a fixed-price
contract, the contractor bears the cost risk. The
disadvantages of the FPAF contract are that it requires a
greater devotion of Government personnel to monitor contractor
performance. Further, without proper training it holds the
potential for abuse by Government personnel due to biased
evaluations and attempts to gold-plate the requirement. Also,
if deficiencies are not noted in a timely manner the
contractor cannot effectively correct these deficiencies.
5
.
What Changes Would be Necessary in the Federal
Acquisition Regulation in Order to Recognize a
Fixed-Price-Award-Fee Contract Type?
To recognize the FPAF contract, the FAR would require
an additional subpart within Part 16, "Types of Contracts."
In addition, various minor changes to other parts would also
be necessary. This addition involves no significant changes
to the FAR.
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D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
(1) Cost-benefit analysis be conducted on completed FPAF
contracts to ascertain the effectiveness of this
contract type in promoting more than minimal contractor
performance.
(2) Analysis of how to determine the effective range of the
award fee incentive.
(3) Evaluation of the process by which the Defense
Acquisition Regulatory Council and the Civilian Agency
Acquisition Council interact to evaluate recommended
changes to the FAR.
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF PERSONNEL INTERVIEWED
1. Carter, Glenn H. , Procurement Analyst, Office of
Procurement Management, Department of Commerce, Washington,
D.C., Interview, May 1989.
2. Edwards, Larry G. , Chief of the Operational Specialized
Branch, Tactical Air Command, Tyndall Air Force Base,
Florida, Interview, May 1989.
3. Greene, Linda E., Navy Defense Acquisition Council
Representative, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy, Shipbuilding and Logistics, Washington, D.C.,
Interview May 1989.
4. Guenther, Walter, Procurement Analyst, Office of the
Secretary of Transportation, Acquisition and Grant
Management, Washington, D.C., Interview, May 1989.
5. Leder, Elaine D. , Director of Service Contracts Division,
Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Western Division, San
Bruno, California, Interview, May 1989.
6. Lloyd, Robert, Manager for Policy and Review Programs,
Department of the Treasury, Washington, D.C., Interview,
May 1989.
7. Lovett, Edward T. , Department of Energy representative to
the Civilian Agency Acquisition Council and Procurement
Analysis, Office of Policy, Department of Energy,
Washington, D.C., Interviews, March 1989, May 1989.
8. Maraist, William J., Director of Procurement Policy
Division, National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
Washington, D.C., Interviews, February 1989, June 1989.
9. Moore, Jerry J., Major, USAF, Contracting Acquisition
Management Officer, Office of Secretary of the Air
Force/AQCO, Washington, D.C., Interview, May 1989.
10. Muzio, David A., Deputy Associate Administrator for Policy,
Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Washington, D.C.,
Interview, April 1989.
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11. Nelson, Loural A., Director of Construction Division,
Officer in Charge of Construction, Naval Facilities
Engineering Command Contracts, TRIDENT, Kings Bay, Georgia,
Interviews, February 1989, March 1989, May 1989.
12. O'Neill, John L. , Supervisory Procurement Analyst, Federal
Acquisition Regulatory Staff, Washington, D.C., Interview,
May 1989.
13. Ratkus, Anthony G. Jr., Contract Specialist, Contract and
Acquisition Division, Internal Revenue Service, Washington,
D.C., Interview, May 1989.
14. Scheuchenzuber, Michael, Supervisory Procurement Analyst,
Office of Procurement Management, Department of Commerce,
Washington, D.C., Interview, June 1989.
15. Schstrom, Richard W. , Acting Chief Director of Procurement
and Grant Policy, Department of Labor, Washington, D.C.,
Interview, June 1989.
16. Shields, Mildred, Acquisition Management Services,
Department of Veteran Affairs, Washington, D.C., Interview,
May 1989.
17. Stevenson, Curtis N., Deputy for Defense Acquisition
Council, Procurement Policy, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Army, Research, Development and
Acquisition, Washington, D.C., Interview, May 1989.
18. Tyckoski, James E., Director of Domestic Policy and
Compliance in the Office of the Procurement Executive,
Department of State, Washington, D.C., Interview, May 1989.
19. Ustad, Ida, Division Director, General Services
Administration Policy, Office of General Services
Administration Policy and Regulation, General Services
Administration, Washington, D.C., Interview, May 1989.
20. Walker, Patricia J., Procurement Analyst, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Base Closures and Utilization




1. What is the purpose, as you perceive it, of the award fee
incentive?
2. Do you think the award fee incentive can be applied to
fixed-price contracts?
3. If the award fee incentive is applied to a fixed-price
contract what are its advantages?
4. If the award fee incentive is applied to a fixed-price
contract what are its disadvantages?
5. Do you perceive the use of a fixed-price-award-fee hybrid
contract as being authorized by the FAR?
6. Has your agency used a fixed-price-award-fee contract or
the award fee with other types of fixed-price contracts?
7. If the award fee incentive is used in fixed-price contracts
should the fee limitations associated with cost-
reimbursement contracts apply?
8. If the award fee incentive is used in fixed-price contracts
should the contract structure be similar or different than
if used in a cost-reimbursement contract?
9. If the award fee incentive is applied to a fixed-price
contract should the base fee objective in a cost-
reimbursement structure apply to the fixed-price contract
(Should the base profit range be limited to zero to three
percent)
?
10. In your opinion, does the language in the FAR concerning
the award fee incentive sufficiently describe its use?
11. In your opinion, does the fact that the FAR does not
recognize a fixed-price-award-fee contract limit its use in
Federal procurement?
12. Should the FAR be changed to recognize the Fixed-price-
award-fee contract as a specific type?
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13. Should the term "fee" be applied when the award fee concept




PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION
16.208 Fixed-price-award-fee contracts.
A Fixed-price-award-fee contract is a fixed-price contract
that provides for a fee consisting of (a) a firm-fixed-price,
(including any profit objective) fixed at inception of the
contract, and (b) an award amount, based upon a judgmental
evaluation by the Government, sufficient to provide motivation
for excellence in contract performance. Fixed-price-award-fee
contracts are covered in Subpart 16.4, Incentive Contracts.
See 16.403-3 for a more complete description, discussion,
limitations, and prescribed clauses concerning the application
of these contracts.
16.403-3 Fixed-price-award-fee contracts.
(a) Description . A fixed-price-award-fee contract is a
fixed-price contract that provides for a price not subject to
any adjustment on the basis of the contractor's cost experi-
ence in performing the contract and for a fee consisting of an
award amount that the contractor may earn in whole or in part
during performance and that is sufficient to provide motiva-
tion for excellence in such areas as quality, timeliness,
technical ingenuity, and effective management. The amount of
the award fee to be paid is determined by the Government's
judgmental evaluation of the contractor's performance in terms
of the criteria stated in the contract. This determination is
made unilaterally by the Government and is not subject to the
Disputes clause.
(b) Application . (1) The fixed-price-award-fee contract
is suitable for use when
—
(i) The work to be performed is such that it is
neither feasible nor effective to devise predetermined
objective incentive targets applicable to such areas as
management, quality, performance or schedule;
(ii) The likelihood of meeting acquisition objectives
will be enhanced by using a contract that effectively moti-
vates the contractor toward exceptional performance and
provides the Government with the flexibility to evaluate both
actual performance and the conditions under which it was
achieved;
67
(iii) Any additional administrative effort and cost
required to monitor and evaluate performance are justified by
the expected benefits; and
(iv) When the desired performance for the supplies or
services required cannot be objectively measured or defined as
contract-specific, but nevertheless are still a valuable
condition of the contract.
(2) The number of evaluation criteria and the require-
ments they represent will differ widely among contracts. The
criteria and rating plan should motivate the contractor to
improve performance in the areas rated, but not at the expense
of minimum acceptable performance in all other areas.
(3) Fixed-price-award-fee contracts shall, as a minimum,
provide for:
(i) Total award fee available during the contract
performance;
(ii) Evaluation criteria established prior to contract
award and clarification that the criteria may change during
the contract performance provided the contractor is notified
in a reasonable time of the change;
(iii) Evaluations at stated intervals during perfor-
mance, so that the contractor will periodically be informed of
the quality of its performance and the areas in which improve-
ment is expected;
(iv) Assignment of the Government's performance
monitors that will evaluate the contractor's performance;
(v) Assignment of a Fee Determination Official (FDO)
to be responsible for assessing the contractor's performance
based upon the input from the Government monitors and deter-
mining the amount of award fee earned for each performance
period; and
(vi) If the contracting office determines that the
dollar value or complexity of the contract will require
detailed evaluation, a Performance Evaluation Board (PEB) may
be established.
(4) A portion of the award fee is allocated to each
evaluation period. Payment of fee is based on the contrac-
tor's performance during the evaluation period. This can
create an effective incentive by inducing the contractor to
improve poor performance or to continue good performance. The
contractor may earn the award fee in total, in part, or not at
all.
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(c) Limitations . No fixed-price-award-fee contract shall
be awarded unless
—
(1) The maximum award fee available is not greater than
ten percent of the Government's estimated contract cost,
excluding profit,
(2) The contract amount, performance period, and expected
benefits are sufficient to warrant the additional administra-
tive effort and cost involved.
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